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Since 2008, over three terms of а National Party-led government, the 
environment went from being an issue that barely registered with the 
electorate to becomingperhaps the dominant issue of the 2017 election. The 
past nine years witnessed а dramatic escalation of environmental proЬlems 
across New Zealand, with issues as wide-ranging as water quality, waste 
management, Ьiodiversity loss and climate change receiving prominent 
attention in the puЬlic arena. Such perceptions of deepeningenvironmental 
damage in recent years have scarred the 'clean, green and 100% pure' image 
that New Zealand has assiduously cultivated over the last few decades. 
In many ways, puЬlic concerns about the state of the environment were 
not а surprise given the high profile campaigns run Ьу organisations such as 
Greenpeace in the last several years. Equally importancly, ordinary people 
were starting to experience the impacts of environmental proЬlems in very 
direct ways and on an unprecedented scale - Ье it illness and death from 
contaminated water as in Havelock North in 2016 (Radio New Zealand 
2017а), or floodingfrom extremeweather events thatleft thousandshomeless 
across the country (BilЬy 2017). Yet, despite the perceptiЬle shift in puЬlic 
opinion on worsening environmental prohlems (Hughey et al. 2016), the 
National-led government continued to take а minimalist approach to the 
multiple issues crowding the horizon. It matched its rductance to act with 
а tendency for oЬfuscation in reporting on environmental indicators (Јоу 
2015; see also Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2016Ь, 
рр. 18, 22), offering up symbolic gestures such as adopting greenhouse 
gas emissions targets with little policy detail to correspond to the rhetoric 
(Масеу2014). 
The result was а fragmented and poorly performing environmental 
policy sector, reflecting an overriding ideological commitment to neo-
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liberal economic thinking and policy capture Ьу economic elites who 
were seemingly indifferent to environmental concerns. Тhе curreщ 
state of the environment, while clearly not the sole responsibllity of the 
previous government, offers compelling evidence of National's failure 
to recognise that macro-economic indicators of growth are rarely ever 
adequate indicators or measures for environmental and social well-being. 
This failure to appropriately address questions of sustainaЬle resource 
management and resource access remains one of the lasting legacies of the 
Кеу government. 
We explore in this chapter1 the performance of the Кеу government on 
environmental policy, focusing in particular on two major environmental 
issues that confront New Zealand - climate change and water quality. We 
trace the evolution of these issues and examine the relevant policies and 
their implications for environmental sustainability. We begin with an 
overview of the institutional context and the ideological commitments that 
underpin policy-making in New Zealand. 
lnstitutional and legislative context 
New Zealand's unitary form of government has historically been marked 
Ьу а high concentration of power at the centre. Тhere was а period of greater 
devolution of powers to local and regional government, as seen in the 2002 
reforms to the Local Government Act (LGA), but Ьу the mid-2000s this 
had started to Ье reversed (Harker et al. 2017). Тhе resulting centralisation 
of power, especially since 2008, has had profound implications for the 
abllity of local government to respond to environmental and resource 
management challenges in their region. During the nine years of the 
National-led government, policy developments systematically stripped the 
provisions for local governance on environmental, social, economic and 
cultural well-being from the relevant pieces of legislation, especially the 
Resource Management Act {RMA) and the LGA. 
Тhе RMA, which provides for environmental governance across national, 
regional and local levels, with consideraЬle scope for puЬlic participation 
through а submissions process, was the target of major reforms under the 
National-led government. As Harker, Taylor and Knight-Lenihan (2017) 
narrate, these amendments 'enaЬle nationally significant plan changes 
and development applications to circumvent local government decision-
making processes and limit puЬlic stakeholder participation' (р. 491). 
Other reforms put through Ьу the previous Labour-led government in 2004 
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removed provisions for regional councils to 'consider the adverse effects of 
GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions from proposed activities such as thermal 
power plants, when granting discharge permits' (Harker et al. 2017). 
Although the stated intention of this reform was to allow for the creation 
of national environmental standards for GHG emissions as well as other 
mitigation measures, the National-led government afi:er 2008 abandoned 
any such effort. Other steps, such as New Zealand's participation in global 
initiatives delivered under the auspices of ICLEI (Local Governments for 
Sustainability), including 'Communities for Climate Protection', were also 
discontinued Ьу the National-led government (Harker et al. 2017). In effect, 
New Zealand's climate change policy floundered, with а conscious focus on 
being а 'fast follower' rather than а global leader (Dominion Post 2014). 
Alongside changes to the RMA, the LGA was amended in 2012 to 
remove 'sustainaЬle development' from local government's purposes. 
The LGA's references to promoting 'social, economic, environmental 
and cultural well-being' were replaced with the following commitment: 
'То meet the current and future needs of communities for good quality 
local infrastructure, local puЬlic services, and performance of regulatory 
functions in а way ehat is mose cost effective for households and businesses' 
(Local Governmene Act 2002 Amendment Асе 2012). 
As а number of submissions to the select commietee pointed out, these 
changes weakened democratic institutions and processes Ьу reducing the 
autonomy of local government bodies. Certainly, they appeared to reflect 
little other than an ideological commitment to serving business interests at 
the expense of а holistic commitment to sustainaЬle communities (PuЬlic 
Service Association 2012; Cheyne 2012). lt is noteworthy that the reforms 
were opposed Ьу all 78 local authorities, with the President of Local 
Government New Zealand (LGNZ), Lawrence Yule, stating, 'The four 
well-beings are not putting cost pressures on councils, but the fast rising 
prices for essential supplies such as hitumen for roading are. The well-beings 
provide clarity' (LGNZ 2012). From the perspective of environmental 
policy, these changes to the LGA prevented 'environmental well-being' 
from being used as the rationale for adopting relevant policies, whether on 
climate change or а range of other issues. 
In addition to such reforms, а significant policy initiative Ьу the 
government was the passing of ehe Environmental Reporeing Асе 2015, 
which made national environmental reporting mandatory for the 6.rst 
time. The Act replaced the ad hoc production of'state of the environment' 
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reports Ьу the Ministry for the Environment. Instead, the Government 
Statistician and the Secretary for the Environment were responsiЬle for 
producing а 'domain' report on one of five environmental topics {air, 
freshwater, land, marine, and atmosphere and climate) every six months, 
with а comprehensive synthesis report every three years. The first synthesis 
report - Environment Aotearoa 2015 - was generally welcomed Ьу experts 
despite concerns expressed about the quality of some of the data presented 
(Science Media Centre 2015). 
The National-led government also issued а National Policy Statement 
{NPS) on freshwater in 2014, which met with widespread criticism. 
The NPS was descriЬed as '20 years too late and toothless' {Јоу 2014). 
Ecologist Russell Death commented, 'The NPS on freshwater is а long 
way from any significant protection for our rivers and streams' (Morton 
2018). The proposal to categorise rivers and streams as 'wadeaЬle' instead of 
'swimmaЬle' came in for ridicule from many in the puЬlic and the scientific 
community, while reinforcing а perception that the government was not 
serious about addressing the issue of water quality. The sharp deterioration 
in water quality due to intensification of dairy farming became а significant 
issue in the 2017 dection. 
On multiple fronts, then, the last nine years saw а dramatic decline 
in environmental quality. The Department of Conservation (DOC) also 
faced significant cuts to its budget, forcing it to enter into puЬlic-private 
partnerships that have not always served the conservation agenda. For 
example, while New Zealand has the 'highest number of endangered species 
on Earth' (Newshub 2018), the environmental organisation Forest & Bird, 
in 2017, gave the government's new 'threatened species strategy' а 'four out 
of ten', saying it would Ье insufficient to 'reverse the crisis affecting New 
Zealand's native species' (Forest & Bird 2017). As Dinica (2015) comments, 
While the government has made consideraЬle progress in opening 
up the conservation estate to businesses ... there are no concrete 
statements from government members or DOC officials, and no 
policy developments or legal initiatives, setting out the latter part 
of the equation: conservation gains, or wider environmental gains, 
from more tourism concessions in national parks. (р. 33) 
It is, however, the issues of climate change and water quality that became 
the focus of sustained activism and scientific concern over the last fewyears. 
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Climate change 
Perhaps the clearest sign of the National-led government's reluctance to act 
on environmental issues comes from the state of New Zealand's climate 
policy. The government's approach to climate change mitigation in the last 
decade, on both international and domestic fronts, cemented New Zealand' s 
global image as а 'laggard' (Barrett et а!. 2015). Part of the difficulty in 
getting action on climate change mitigation in New Zealand lies in its 
somewhat unusual emissions profile for а developed country, with nearly 
50 per cent of its emissions coming from the agricultural sector, and the 
remaining amount mairtly from energy - primarily industry and transport. 
Although 85 per cent of electricity generation is already from renewaЬle 
sources, with limited low-cost options to reduce emissions (Boston 2015), 
the government failed to implement relatively straightforward policy 
initiatives such as setting fuel-efficiency standards for transport, shifting 
road freight to rail and shipping, and reducing the open-road speed limit to 
90 kph (Williams 2017). 
Yet what was evident in the tenure of the Кеу government was an active 
agenda to weaken апу commitment to GHG emissions mitigation, with 
business and agricultural interests systematically trumping sustainability 
concerns, even while never abandoning the rhetoric of taking climate 
change seriously. Кеу himself never subscrihed to climate denialism, unlike 
Don Brash, his predecessor as party leader, or Rodney Hide, а vocal climate 
change denier and а former leader of the АСТ Party, National's confidence-
and-supply partner. In terms of policy practice, however, the net effect of 
weak climate policies was а lack of action that would have possiЬly satisfied 
both Brash and Hide. 
The National-led government frequently claimed that the country's 
deceptively small contrihution to global GHG emissions justified taking 
minimal action. But it is worth noting that even though New Zealand 
contrihutes only 0.17 per cent of global emissions, it is ranked the seventh 
worst in terms of per capita emissions among industrialised countries 
(Gudsell 2017). Although prior to his election in 2008 Кеу committed 
to upholding the country's obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, he had 
changed his mind Ьу his second term. In 2012, the National-led government 
withdrew from making legally hinding reductions in GHG emissions in 
the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (from 2013 to 2020), 
opting instead to report its climate change progress on а voluntary basis. 
Other than the morally duhious nature of this stance, one consequence 
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of this has been that New Zealand cannot access the emissions trading 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (Boston 2015). 
The government's decision to commit to а 30 per cent reduction in 
GHG emissions below 2005 levels (effectively an 11 per cent reduction 
below 1990 levels) at Paris in 2015 was widely seen as inadequate. John 
Key's claim that New Zealand was leading the way in removing fossil fuel 
subsidies earned the country the inaugural 'Fossil of the Day' award from 
the Climate Action Network, which said of the prime minister: 
Primc: Minister John Кеу showed а degree ofhypocrisy Ьу daiming, 
at а Friends ofFossil Fuel Subsidy Reform evc:nt, that New Zealand 
is а leader on fossil fud subsidy abolition - despite the country's 
fossil fuel production subsidies increasing sc:ven-fold since his 
election in 2008. His phoney grandstanding сате just а week after 
claiming that New Zealand 'doesn't need to Ье and shouldn't Ье а 
leader in climate change'. Are you getting mixed signals too? Or is 
it just us? (New Zealand Herald 2015)2 
Thus, despite New Zealand's participation in the international negotiations 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), its initial endorsement of the Kyoto Protocol, and its 
early ratification of the Paris Agreement in October 2016, the failure of 
meaningful domestic policy action undermined its international standing 
on environmental, and specifically climate change, issues. 
On the domestic front, the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), set up 
Ьу the previous Clark government in 2008, was the first time that any 
government had covered all sectors of the economy and had included the 
six greenhouse gases specified Ьу the Kyoto Protocol (Barrett et al. 2015, 
р. 168). The intent of the ETS was to put а price on carbon to 'stimulate 
efficient reductions in GHG emissions' (Harker et al. 2017, р. 493). Ву that 
measure it has been а clear failure. New Zealand's net annual emissions 
increased Ьу 42.2 per cent from 38 MtC02e [metric tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent] in 1990 to 54.2 MtC02e in 2013, according to а 2013 report 
Ьу the Ministry for the Environment (Harker et al. 2017). The reasons for 
this failure are many, including the government's reliance on purchasing 
international carbon credits instead of pursuing domestic policies to ensure 
emissions reduction. As Macfie (2017) points out, the ETS scheme was 
'flooded with Russian and Ukrainian credits from 2011 to 2015, causing 
the price of carbon to collapse and the scheme to become discredited' 
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until these fake credits were banned in 2015.3 This strategy of rdying on 
international credits was not only risky, but it also became а mechanism, 
wittingly or unwittingly, of sabotaging domestic efforts to reduce emissions 
- through investment in clean technologies and renewaЬle energy, tree 
planting, and so on - efforts that could not compete with the cheap overseas 
credits (Масеу 2014; see also MacArthur and Sewerin n.d.). 
Despite promising to uphold New Zealand's oЬligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol, one of the first acts of the Кеу government - as part of the 
National Party's deal with the АСТ Party and United Future - was to put 
the ETS up for review. Several amendments followed, beginning with the 
repeal in 2009 of 'а partial ban on the construction of new fossil-fuelled 
electricity generation and а minimum sales oЬligation on biofuds (0.34% 
of total sales)' (Bertram and Terry 2010, р. 155). In 2012 the Climate 
Change Response (Emissions Тrading and Other Matters) Amendment 
Bill 2012 was passed, deferring the agricultural sector's entry into the 
ETS indefinitely. Each of these amendments was justified Ьу the relevant 
climate change ministers - Nick Smith, Тim Groser and Paula Bennett 
- in the name of 'Ьalancing the economic and environmental interests' of 
the country. А new target of cutting GHG emissions Ьу 50 per cent below 
1990 levels Ьу 2050 was set (Ministry for the Environment 2011), but there 
was no serious plan or discussion about how this goal would Ье achieved 
(Масеу 2014).4 In addition to the systematic weakening of the ETS, 
many 'complementary measures' developed over the previous 
decade to help reduce emissions have also been scaled back or 
terminated. Equally important, at the heart of the government's 
economic growth agenda are the goals of douЬling the value of 
New Zealand's agricultural exports and expanding the exploration 
and production of fossil fuds. This represents а high-carЬon, not а 
decarbonisation, strategy. (Boston 2015, р. 490) 
Overall, when we weigh up New Zealand's climate policy, its failure 
is apparent on many fronts. There was а policy vacuum created Ьу the 
failure of the ETS, together with active constraints on the mandate oflocal 
government and the piecemeal nature of policy initiatives (Масеу 2014, р. 
54). This was compounded Ьу 'а lack of an effective market signal and poor 
policy integration', as reflected in transport funding, where no attempt has 
been made to assess the GHG emissions implications of а rapidly expanding 
road network (Harker et al. 2017, р. 493). The absence of any political will 
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to take action is, no doubt, а reflection of what Boston (2015, рр. 486-7) 
descrihes as the 'four asymmetries' that discourage mitigation efforts - а 
voting asymmetry, where those affected Ьу climate change, such as the youth 
and future generations, have no vote, and those with the vote, who may Ье 
adversely affected in the short term Ьу mitigation efforts, vote against them; 
а cost-benefit asymmetry, where costs are incurred Ьу the current generation, 
while intangiЬle benefits are gained Ьу future generations; interest group 
asymmetry, where those most affected Ьу mitigation efforts - the dairy 
industry, fossil fuel industry and manufacturers - are well-resourced with 
significant lobЬying powers; and accounting asymmetry, where some costs, 
such as loss of Ьiodiversity and ecosystem damage, are externalised and 
unaccounted for in the decision-making. 
Finally, а fundamental measure of the failure of the Кеу government's 
action on climate change is from the perspective of justice. The consequences 
of climate inaction are not uniformly experienced. The impacts of climate 
change disproportionatdy affect those most vulneraЬle and marginalised -
youth, the elderly, Maori, and, amongst others, New Zealand's Pacific Island 
neighbours (Munshi et al. forthcoming; Hayward 2017). Perhaps the starkest 
point of distinction between the National-led government's approach to 
climate policy and that of the newly elected Labour-led government came 
during the 2017 election campaign, at the Labour Party's 19 August campaign 
launch and then subsequently, when Labour leader Jacinda Ardern stated, 
'Climate change is my generation's nuclear-free moment'. That statement, 
embracing the ethical imperative for climate action, reset the national agenda 
with а promise to progress towards carbon neutrality Ьу 2050,5 contrasting 
sharply with the 'Ьusiness as usual' approach of the National-led government. 
Water 
The issue of fresh water has been of growing puЬlic concern, with questions 
around who takes, uses and owns fresh water, along with concerns about 
its quality for drinking, swimming and sustaining life, featuring strongly 
in the media and the 2017 election campaign (Davison 2017f; Water 
New Zealand 2017). The past decade has seen the ongoing unchecked 
intensification of dairy farming, with its consequent impacts on both water 
quality and methane emissions. The statistics are telling: 
• 72 per cent of native freshwater fish are threatened with or at risk of 
extinction (Ministry for the Environment and Statistics New Zealand 
2017Ь) 
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• More than 60 per cent of rivers are not safe for swimming (Cook 2016) 
• 20 per cent of New Zealanders are supplied with potentially unsafe 
drinking water - this percentage is considered to Ье significantly 
underestimated (Government Inquiry into Havelock North Drinking 
Water 2017, р. 25, 30). 
As with climate change policy, the worsening water quality around the 
country was driven largely Ьу а government agenda so dominated Ьу 
economic growth that questions of protecting an important natural 
resource did not really feature. 
When National came into government in 2008, freshwater was 
primarily governed Ьу regional councils using the Resource Management 
Act Ьу means ofan instruments such as regional plans and water permits. 6 
The inadequacy of earlier policy to effectively address freshwater issues had 
long been acknowledged (see, for example, Memon 1997), in particular, 
the need for а national strategy. The development of а National Policy 
Statement for Freshwater Management (NPS-FM) came out of work 
undertaken Ьу the SustainaЬle Water Programme of Action (SWPOA), 
originally convened in 2003, and the Land and Water Forum, convened 
in 2008. The 6.rst NPS-FM was adopted in 2011 to guide decision-
making at regional and district council level, without specifying any 
limits or standards. The NPS-FM 2014 introduced supportingguidelines 
with limits via the addition of а National Objectives Framework (NOF), 
which was subsequentlyamendedin 2017. The NPS-FM 2011 was notaЬle 
for how long it took to produce, given that it was signalled at the time of 
the RMA work in the early 1990s. Ву 2017 the NPS-FM 6.nally had the 
weight of law behind it (councils must give it effect in their planning), 
and, with the amended NOF, there were now explicit national bottom 
lines for water quality. 
Despite а concrete water policy 6.nally emerging on а national level 
under the National-led government, its adequacy and effectiveness 
have been questioned Ьу experts and the puЬlic. For example, the Land 
and Water Forum was set up to undertake an extensive 'collaborative 
governance process' for the А Fresh Look at Fresh Water project in order to 
provide recommendations for the government (Smith and Carter 2009). 
The government's response to the report, involving numerous delays and 
sdective application of the Forum's recommendations, resulted in the 
frustrated withdrawal of several key Forum members, including Fish and 
Game and Forest & Bird (Mitchell 2017). 
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Given the highly charged nature of the debates over deteriorating water 
quality, including who is to Ье held responsiЬle and what solutions should 
Ье adopted, science became an early victim, bandied about Ьу politicians 
and farmers, for example, to oppose those calling for changes to the existing 
water management regime. An interview with John Кеу on the BBC's 
Hardtalk programme saw the prime minister suggesting that the analysis 
of water quality Ьу scientist Dr Mike Јоу was merdy an 'opinion', one that 
could Ье countered Ьу other scientists (Manhire 2011). This did little to 
stem increasing attention on the quality ofNew Zealand water as part of its 
'clean green' brand (Zalk 2017Ь). 
Despite the signi6.cance of national standards as contained in the NOF, 
there was criticism that some standards were an actual weakeningof existing 
ANZECC 2000 standards7 (in use Ьу many regional councils), resulting in 
а reduction in water quality in some rivers and lakes (Јоу 2015, рр. 42-43). 
These concerns exploded in the media, along with puЬlic protests on the 
lowering of the 'swimmaЬle' measure in the NPS-FM 2017: it aimed at 
making '90% of our rivers and lakes ... swimmaЬle Ьу 2040' (Smith 2017), 
but the threshold for swimming in terms of Е. coli presence was set lower 
than the previous standard. 8 In addition, other measures of water quality 
were ambiguous or omitted entirely. For example, the 'unders and overs' 
approach (where one site might degrade, but Ье offset Ьу improved quality 
elsewhere in the region or catchment in order to maintain or improve overall 
water quality) evident in the NPS-FM 2014 is still а concern in the current 
version. The use of the term overall is seen as amhiguous and proЬlematic 
and could result in permanent degradation of а site so as long as it is offset 
(РСЕ 2015, 2016а). Critiques of the policy also identified omissions; 
in particular, one critical indicator concerning freshwater quality, the 
Macroinvertebrate Community Index (MCI), was absent (Јоу 2015; New 
Zealand Freshwater Sciences Society, 2013; Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment 2015, 2016а). 
Finally, the reliance on traditional mechanisms for addressing water 
quality (such as fencing - а major focus of government and the industry-
led Clean Water Accord, along with national stock exclusion regulations9) 
was also challenged Ьу а variety of actors as inadequate. Research has 
shown that fencing cannot Ье the only solution deployed, as it focuses only 
on а small number of larger streams and rivers, leaving smaller and more 
prolific waterways open to pollutants, which contriЬute 77 per cent of the 
pollution load nationwide (McDowell et al. 2017). The escalation of water 
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quality concerns became the focus of the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment (РСЕ), whose report Water quality in New Zealand: 
Land use and nutrient pollution (РСЕ 2013) revealed serious concerns 
about practices such as dairy conversion and intensification.10 This shifi: in 
land use, intensification and productivity - tak.ing place over two decades 
from the early 1990s under both Labour- and National-led governments -
significantly increased the concentration of phosphate and, in particular, 
nitrogen goingintowaterways (РСЕ 2013). The prime minister, in response, 
flagged the government's intent to use 'greater science or other techniques 
со reduce the environmental impacts as we look со increase farm output' 
(Hickey 2013). This statement reveals both а na:ive faith in science and 
technology and, simultaneously, а refusal to accept scientific advice that has 
long indicated there was no technological silver bullet that would save the 
environment from the impacts of growing dairy intensification. 
Between 2008 and 2017, water management and allocation became 
areas of concern, in particular through economic growth initiatives such 
as irrigation and water bottling. For example, widespread debate and 
disagreement about how to manage water issues in the heavily irrigated 
region of Canterbury led to the government dismissing the elected 
councillors and replacing them with appointed commissioners at the 
regional council (lnstitute of PuЬlic Administration New Zealand 2010). 
ln addition, potential consents for the bottling of fresh water for export 
included attempts Ьу NZ Pure Вlue to access water in Ashburton in 
2016 (Benfield 2017) and Putaruru in 2017. While both were ultimately 
unsuccessful, local iwi made it clear in their opposition to the Putaruru 
application that economic gain would not Ье prioritised at the expense of 
the environment (Preston 2017). This was in stark contrast to the increased 
economic value the government were seeking to gain from water and other 
natural resources (Dinica 2015; Smith 2010). 
The focus on 'greening growth' - increasing the economic value derived 
from natural resources (New Zealand Government 2012а) - also saw 
water demand increase. This increased demand is particularly evident in 
irrigation. 'Excluding hydroelectricity consents, irrigation was the largest 
consented consumptive use of water (65.9 per cent of consents) in the 
2013-14 water reporting year (July 2013 to June 2014)' (Ministry for the 
Environment and Statistics New Zealand 2017а). 
Overall, in considering fresh water policy under the N ational-led 
government, the picture that emerges is one where the drive for economic 
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growth and profitaЬility overcame concerns for the environmental 
protection of а significant resource. Despite the introduction of а national 
policy statement on fresh water, the overwhelming concern of iwi, the 
puЬlic and scientists about the long-term sustainaЬility of water remained 
unaddressed. 
Conclusion 
Given the broad scope of the environment and the complexity of issues 
concerning it, environmental policy development can Ье slow, as has 
frequently been the case in New Zealand. The National-led government 
was, in fact, active in environmental policy-making during its three terms 
in government, and paid specific attention to an area long neglected, 
namely, freshwater. The development of а set of national standards for 
water quality was in principle а significant policy contriЬution, as was 
the introduction of the Environmental Reporting Act 2015. Both these 
instruments provide а degree of support to local authorities through 
management and guidarice from а national level, which has been lacking 
in many environmental areas (Масеу 2014; OECD 2017с). Yet there are 
fundamental questions about the direction and effectiveness of the policy-
making in actually addressing environmental proЬlems. The state of the 
environment - and the nature of the relevant policies - across а range 
of issues, and specifically climate change and water, reveal that policies 
during the Кеу era prioritised economic growth over environmental and 
social sustainaЬility. 
One significant determinant of the influence of the executive office of 
government on the effectiveness of environmental policy in New Zealand 
is the 'level of government commitment to environmental values relative 
to other values' (Logan 2013, р. 179). During its three terms in office, the 
National-led government demonstrated an overarching commitment to а 
neo-liberal economic ideology underpinning а business growth agenda and 
market principles. In line with such an ideology, there was а reluctance to 
intervene via regulations and legislation to ensure environmental and social 
sustainaЬility. Critics say that the removal of environmental sustainaЬility 
values from legislation on resource management (Palmer 2013), local 
government (Harker et al 2017) and transport (Smith 2016) have greatly 
reduced the aЬility of local authorities and other agencies to address 
environmental issues. This change also diminished an integrated approach 
to environmental issues, which has been shown to Ье critical to the success 
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of environmental policies, as the sources of environmental pressure are 
found in many non-environmental policy areas (Biihrs 2009, р. 31). 
Even DOC, with its mandate to protect the conservation estate, was 
required to prioritise economic development through the introduction 
of the 'conservation economy' in the first Statement of lntent Ьу its new 
National minister (Department of Conservation 2009, р. 7). This signalled 
changes to the Conservation Act (in 2012 and 2013) and other policies and 
practices, in line with the Building Natural Resources programme, which 
aimed at fostering Ъusiness opportunities on puЬlic conservation land in 
order to deliver increased economic prosperity and conservation gain' (New 
Zealand Government 2012а, р. 23, emphasis added). Such an economic 
growth objective is in stark contrast to the 'hierarchy of legally-prescriЬed 
[conservation] objectives for DOC, particularly with respect to national 
parks' (Dinica 2015, р. 29), with little evidence of conservation gains со 
date (Dinica 2015). 
This economically driven environmental agenda has led not only to 
the material consequences of а more degraded environment, but also to а 
sharply evident disjuncture between rhetoric and action. New Zealand's 
'clean green' and '100% Pure' rhetoric and branding has increasingly 
been attacked internationally (Barkham 2017; Macfie 2017; Zalk 2017а), 
while also being rejected Ьу а significant section of the New Zealand 
puЬlic (Hughey et al. 2016). The reputational damage from negative 
international attention, and the actual environmental destruction, with 
its spiralling consequences for people's health and well-being and the long-
term sustainabllity of the country, are both indicators of the National-led 
government's environmental record. 
During the National-led government's tenure, New Zealand was 
categorised as 'inadequate' or 'insufficient' in terms of its response to 
mitigating climate change, with policy projections showing an increase in 
emissions (Climate Action Tracker 2017). The National-led government 
often presented the country as а good global citizen Ьу continuing to sign 
ир to or support GHG mitigation commitments, but, as noted, this was 
rarely translated into action. This lack of clarity or detail in policy was 
also identified Ьу the РСЕ with respect to environmental reporting. The 
Environmental Reporting Act states its purpose as being 'to require regular 
reporting on New Zealand's environment' (Environmental Reporting Act 
2015). As the Commissioner observed, '"regularity" is not а purpose .... 
Because the environment is so vast and complex, without limits there is no 
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end to the kinds of statistics that could Ье collected .... Articulating а clear 
purpose ... is essential' (РСЕ 2016Ь, р. 10). Without clarity of purpose, the 
conclusions or 'key findings' risk being meaningless. 
Overall, the environmental policy legacy of the National-led government 
is characterised Ьу the triumph of rhetoric over а meaningful commitment 
to environmental sustainabllity. The period - which marked the arrival 
of terms such as the 'conservation economy' and 'greening growth' as 
part of the prioritisation of neo-liЬeral economic development values -
undermined any genuine possiЬility of attending to environmental issues. 
Over its three terms, intentionally or otherwise, the government did much 
to reveal the hollowness of New Zealand's 'clean and green' image. Equally 
importantly, the legislative changes and other actions of the government 
meant that potentially significant actors, such as local authorities and 
DOC, were weakened in their efforts to address environmental proЬlems. 
Ultimately, the pursuit of short-term economic growth, along with the 
desire to keep economically powerful sectors of society happy, has left the 
country vulneraЬle to the challenges that lie ahead. 
It is perhaps ironic that for а government that prided itself on its economic 
management, it did little to prepare for the top risks identified Ьу the 
World Economic Forum in 2018, including the failure to adapt to climate 
change (Dann 2018а). If one measure of good environmental governance 
is institutionalising and enacting policies and practices that can anticipate 
risks and deliver environmental, social and economic sustainability, then 
there is little on that front that emerges from the National-led government's 
legacy. 
